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PERRY E. BURNHAM and BERTHA 
H. BURNHAM, his wife, and L. 
EARL BURNHAM and GLADYS 
H. BURNHAM, his wife, I 
, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, • 
vs. { 
ALBERT E. REID and LEAH REID, \ 
his wife, CLIFTON B. LAYTON l 
and JACK B. LAYTON, f 
I Defendants and Respondents. ! 
No. 7993 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On the 22nd day of November, 1946, the Cove Ranch 
Land & Livestock Company and others made a contract to 
sell to Clifton B. Layton a ranch in Blaine County, Idaho, 
known as the Cove Ranch, for the total consideration of $70,- · 
000.00. Layton paid $3,000.00 and agreed to pay $17,000.00 
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additional on or before the 1st day of January, 1947, and the 
balance of $50,000.00, together with interest, on or before the 
21st day of January, 1948. On the same day, he and his wife, 
Lois, executed and delivered to A. Edsen Christensen and Ray 
Rosebraugh, a not~ for $10,000.00 and a mortgage covering 
the land which he had ·contracted to buy, to secure payment of 
the note. 
Perry E. Burnham, one of the appellants herein, advanced 
to Layton $17,000.00 with which to complete the first install-
ment payment. The contract has endorsed on it the receipt of 
$10,000.00 on December 7, 1946. 
The balance of the purchase price of this property became 
due on the 21st day of January, 1948, and atthat time, Perry 
E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham paid to the Cove Ranch 
the sum of $46,104.35 and took title to the ranch. $8,000.00 
of the purchase price was paid through the trading of some of 
the land cove~ed by the original contract for other land, and 
$8,000.00 in money, all of which went to the Cove Ranch. 
This payment covered interest and reduced the indebtedness 
to the $46,104.35. Upon payment of the $20,000.00, Layton 
went into possession of the property. Upon the taking of the 
deed by Burnhams in January, 1948, they took possession and 
retained possession in person or by tenants at all times until 
the tnaking of a contract between the Burnhams and the de-
fendants (Tr. 8). The .r;nortgage to Christensen and Rosen-
bra ugh was no( paid, and they brought suit upon the note for 
the foreclosure of the mortgage. Later they endorsed and 
transferred the note and mortgage to Walter Stewart, who 
filed ·an Amended and Supplemental ·Complaint, and n1ade the 
4 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Burnhams parties defendant. The plaintiff, in the Supplemental 
Complaint, pleaded that (Tr. 25): 
tt ••• their (the mortgagors') interest in the prop· 
erty was that of a purchaser, under said written agree-
ment between the said Cove Ranch Land and Livesto.ck 
Co., and said defendants . . ,, 
While the suit was pending and on the 15th day of April, 
· · 1948, Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham gave notice 
to Clifton B. Layton and to Jack Layton and his wife, the as-
signees of the contract of purchase, of the cancellation of 
the agreement ( T r. 30) . 
Clifton B. Layton alleged in his Answer to the Stewart 
Complaint that (Tr. 36): 
"This defendant, being unable to make payment of 
the purchase price of said property so advanced by 
the said Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, was 
compelled to suffer the cancellation of the said agree-
ment.'' 
and Jack Layton admitted that: (Tr. 39) 
(t ••• Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham have 
acquired by purchase the real estate in the Mortgage, 
Exhibit B, and that they are now the owners in fee 
of said property.'' · 
At the tim~ of the trial of the c~se, there was no controversy 
between the plaintiffs and the Laytons. The court found: 
(Tr. 47) 
''That the said Burnhams did not give this plaintiff 
(Stewart) · or the said Christensen and Rosebraugh or 
any o~ them an opportunity to pay the balance unpaid 
on satd contract of November 22, 1946, and did not 
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give any of such persons advance notice of their inten-
tion to forfeit said contract and did not at any time 
tender to Christensen and Rosebraugh or the plaintiff 
or any of them a deed to the property described in 
said agreement of November 22, 1946, or any part 
or portion thereof.'' 
The Court concluded that the plaintiff was entitled to 
have his mortgage foreclosed and the property sold at sheriff's 
sale (Tr. 49). The court corrected the Findings by reciting 
that Grover Giles appeared only for the defendants, Clifton 
B. Layton and Lois Layton (Tr. 50) and by a letter (Tr. 51), 
recited as a finding, the following: 
((Mr. Giles also, on behalf of his clients Clifton 
Layton and wife, appears to be under the impression 
that the Court should at this time make some provi-
sion in the decree of foreclosure requiring the defend-
ants Burnhams, in the event of redemption by Clifton 
B. Layton, to account to his clients for rents and profits 
while the Burnhams have been in possession of the 
mortgaged premises. No issue in this respect appears 
to have been made by the pleadings, and it is not my 
understanding that defendant Clifton B. Layton, at 
the time of the trial, claimed any right to possession 
in or to the mortgage premises as against either the 
defendants Jack B. Layton and wife or the Burnhams." 
A Decree of Foreclosure was entered (Tr. 53), which 
Decree directed the sale of all of the property not\vithstanding 
the m-ortgage purported to cover only the interest of the 
Laytons, which, as to plaintiff Stewart having not been ter-
minated, was subject to foreclosure. This Decree was followed 
by an ·order of Sale (Tr. 57), and the sale by the sheriff of 
all of the property (Tr. 59), as if the mortgage covered the 
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real estate, and not as found by the court, only the right of 
the successors-in-interest of Layton to purchase it. 
Thereafter, the court made an Order. on the petition of 
Clifton B. Layton and Jack Layton fixing the amount payable 
for the redemption of the property from the sale 1nade to the 
Burnhams. The court 'disclaimed any intention of passing upon 
the question as to who had redemption rights. 
In this state of the record of the contracts and foreclosure 
proceedings, the plaintiffs and appellants entered into a con-
tract of sale of their interest to the respondents herein, Albert 
E. Reid and Leah Reid, his wife (Exhibit A to the Complaint-
Tr. 8). This contract is the irnmediat~ occ~sion for this liti-
gation. 
·Two tracts of land described in the Contract (Tr .. 9) were 
not included in the description of the property in the original 
contract of sale and were not included in the mortgage fore-
closed or in the Sheriff's sale-one tract, because it is the 
property received in exchange for some land covered by . the 
original contract, and the other tract was land· omitted from 
the described property in the original contract. We call this to 
the attention of the court at this time because upon the second 
cause of action involving wheat· grown upon this land, the 
court, notwithstanding stipulations, held it had no jurisdiction 
to enter judgment. At the time of the making of the Contract 
(Exhibit A-Tr. 8), between the parties hereto on the 6th day 
of September, 1950, all of the land covered by the contract, 
the certificate of redemption, and the quit-claim deeds, was 
in the possession of a tenant under a crop share contract with 
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the Burnhams. The hay was in the stack and a part of the grain 
was harvested, and a part was being harvested. 
It was thought in the beginning, that all of the facts 
could be stipulated as was contemplated by the Contract of 
September 6th.· Accordingly, the court will find attached to 
the original Complaint, exhibits showing the status of the 
property and the relations between the plaintiffs and the prede-
cessors in interest of the defendants . from the original trans-
actions out of which the controversy has arisen. No evidence 
was offered or received. The judgment is predicated upon the 
record made as indicated. The difficulty arises ouf of the in-
terpretation of the record. We must, however, at this point, 
invite t,he court's attention to a stipulation found in the record 
(Tr. 68) providing for t~e filing of an ~mendment and sup-
plement to the Complaint which wa~ attached to the stipula-
tion and filed on order of the court (October 17, 1951-Tr. 
67), and the Answer to the amendment filed by the defendants 
(Tr. 71). This stipulation, amendment and answer pertain 
to wheat grown upon the land described in the amendment 
which admittedly did not belong to the defendants and which 
pertains solei y to a personal claim against the defendants, 
·and was purely a transitory action. The court refused to con-
sider it upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over 
the subject matter. 
Upon the record made, which also included disclaimers 
by Clifton B. Layton and Jack B. Layton of any interest in 
the crops grown upon the land described in the atnended plead-
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1. That the District Court for Blaine County issued an 
order for the sale of the Cove Ranch and that the plaintiffs 
herein purchased the property. 
2. That plaintiffs and defendants entered into a contract, 
Exhibit ttA" attached to the Complaint, from which a quota-
tion is made. 
3-. That the defendants paid to plaintiffs $81,085.74 and 
plaintiffs issued a certificate of redemption covering the land 
and water rights. 
4. That the tenant, Nek Stelma, was in possession of the 
property as a tenant, and that wheat grown upon the land 
was sold and pursuant to the contract, $3,129.08 was paid to. 
defendants and two-thirds of the landlord's share of the proceeds 
of the sale, amounting to $6,258.05 was placed in escrow with 
Zion's Savings Bank to be paid out upon judgment of the court 
in a suit for a declaratory judgment. The court concluded that 
the plaintiffs were entitled to $2,340.51, and the defendants 
$3,917.54, and further: 
{(That the court cannot terminate the controversy 
of the matter referred to in the supplemental to the 
Complaint . . .". 
and the court entered judgment accordingly. 
POINTS UPON WHICH THE APPELLANTS EXPECT 
TO RELY 
I. The court erroneously assumed the relationship of mort-
gagor and mortgagee existed between Clifton B. Layton and/or 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Jack B. Layton and the plaintiffs herein as to the Cove Ranch 
and that the mortgage foreclosure in the District Court for 
Blaine County, Idaho, was a foreclosure of the mortgage. 
II. The court wholly disregarded the fact as stipulated 
that the foreclosure was the foreclosure of a right on the part 
·of Clifton B. Layton to complete the purchase of the Cove 
Ranch· under contract (Exhibit C-T r. 15) . and that such right 
had been cut off as to Clifton B. Layton and Jack B. Layton 
by notice, pleadings, findings and judgment in Stewart vs. 
Layton et al and existed only as to the right of Stewart, the 
successor-in-interest of the mortgagees, in the mortgage from 
Layton to Christensen et al, to complete the purchase of the 
ranch under said· contract. 
III. The court erroneously assumed and found that the 
District Court . for Blaine County, Idaho, in. the Stewart case, 
had held that the notice of cancellation of the contract between 
· the Cove Ranch and Layton was ineffective for all purposes; 
notwithstanding the cancellation was pleaded by Clifton B. 
Layton and Jack B. Layton. 
IV. The court disregarded the admitted fact that the sole 
title and ownership of . the Cove Ranch was in the plaintiffs 
at all times before and after the execution sale and ·that they 
alone had the. exclusive right to lease the property and to col-
lect and hold as against the whole world all of the rents and 
profits at all times up to the making of the contract between 
the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
V. The court arbitrarily, without application or justifiGt· 
tion, revived the cancelled contract between the Cove Ranch 
1( 
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and Layton and gave the Laytons a right of redemption which 
was not given by the District Court for Idaho and the court 
has, in disregard of the contract between plaintiffs and defend-
ants, added a right which did not exist. 
VI. The court misinterpreted Exhibit A to the complaint, 
(Contract between plaintiffs and defendants) by making it 
include as property sold by plaintiffs to the defendants, per-
sonal property, to-wit: the crops which were harvested and 
ready for harvest at the time of the contract and which were not 
included in the sale, except as to that portion specifically 
covered by the contract. 
VII. The court erroneous! y refused to adjudicate the own-
ership of the wheat grown upon the land described in the 
amendment to the Complaint on the ground of lack of juris-
diction notwithstanding the wheat had no relationship to 
the land, having been severed, and the parties to the contro-
versy were all, by stipulation and order of the court, made 
parties to this proceeding. The court erred in holding some-
thing more than personal jurisdiction was required. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTS I, II, III and IV 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED THERE-
LATIONSHIP OF MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE 
EXISTED BETWEEN CLIFTON B. LAYTON AND/OR 
JACK B. LAYTON AND THE PLAINTIFFS HEREIN AS 
11 
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TO THE COVE RANCH AND THAT THE MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR BLAINE 
COUNTY, IDAHO, WAS A FORECLOSURE OF THE 
MORTGAGE. 
POINT II 
THE COURT WHOLLY DISREGARDED THE FACTS 
AS STIPULATED THAT THE FORECLOSURE WAS THE 
FORECLOSURE OF A RIGHT ON THE PART OF CLIF-
TON B. LAYTON TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF 
THE COVE RANCH UNDER CONTRACT . (EXHIBit 
C-TR. 15) AND THAT SUCH RIGHT HAD BEEN CUT 
OFF AS TO CLIFTON B. LAYTON AND JACK B. LAY-
TON BY NOTICE, PLEADINGS, FINDINGS AND JUDG-
MENT IN STEW ART VS. LAYTON ET ALAND EXISTED 
ONLY AS TO THE RIGHT OF STEWART, THE SUCCES-
SOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE MORTGAGEES, IN THE 
MORTGAGE FROM LAYTON TO CHRISTENSEN ET AL 
TO COMPLETE THE PURCHASE OF THE RANCH UN-
DER SAID CONTRACT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY ASSUMED AND 
FOUND THAT THE DISTRICT COURT FOR BLAINE 
COUNTY, IDAHO, IN THE STEWART CASE, HAD HELD 
THAT THE NOTICE OF CANCELLATION OF T'HE CON-
TRACT BETWEEN THE COVE RANCH AND LAYTON 
12 
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WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR ALL PURPOSES; NOTWITH-
STANDING THE CANCELLATION WAS PLEADED BY 
CLIFTON B. LAYTON AND JACK B. LAYTON. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT DISREGARD:SD THE ADMITTED FACT 
THAT THE SOLE TITLE AND OWNERSHIP OF THE 
COVE RANCH WAS IN THE PLAINTIFFS AT ALL 
TIMES BEFORE AND AFTER THE EXECUTION SALE 
AND THAT THEY ALONE HAD THE EXCLUSIVE 
RIGHT TO LEASE THE PROPERTY AND TO COLLECT 
AND HOLD AS AGAINST THE WHOLE WORLD ALL 
OF THE RENTS AND PROFITS AT ALL TIMES UP TO 
THE MAKING OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN THE 
PLAINTIFFS AND THE DEFENDANTS. 
The court will readily observe that Clifton B. Layton 
had a contract for the purchase of the Cove Ranch for the 
total consideration of $70,000.00, $3,000.00 of which he paid. 
$17,000.00 on the first installment of $20,000.00 was paid by 
Perry E. Burnham, $50,000.00 was payable in January of 1948. 
Layton had no money with which to make the payment. The 
contract read (Tr. 19): 
((That in the event the Fourth Party (Layton) is able 
to complete the said $50,000.00 payment due on or be-
fore the 21st day of January, 1948, the said First, Sec-
ond and Third Parties will make the transfers of title 
as herein provided above for the entire ranch prop-
erties specified, to Clifton B. Layton or his appointee." 
13 
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Layton was not able to make the payments, and t~e plain-
tiffs paid to the Cove Ranch, sellers, the balance of $46,104.35 
-the difference between the $50,000 payment, and interest, 
and the amount paid, covered by the sale of some of the land. 
The Burnhams took legal title to the property and took pos-
session. After that date, Layton was never in possession of the 
property, and he never acquired title thereto. Notwithstanding 
this, Layton gave to Christensen and Rosebraugh a mortgage 
purporting to cover the ranch, to secure payment of a $10,000.00 
note. Christensen brought suit to foreclose the mortgage given 
to secure the $10,000.00 note, and for nothing else. It was 
later assigned to Stewart. This ·suit was for the foreclosure of 
the mortgage, and all of the property constituting the Cove 
Ranch was described in the mortgage attached to the Com-
plaint and in the Decree of the court. It was in that suit, and 
no other, that the foreclosure proceedings went forward. In 
the Complaint, Stewart alleged (Tr. 25): 
UThat at the time of the execution of said second 
mortgage, said defendants' interest in said property 
was that of a purchaser thereof, evidenced by a written 
agreement, executed on the 22nd day of November, 
1946, between the Cove Ranch Land and Livestock 
Co., and others, and the said defendants (Laytons) 
, 
After acquiring the property, Burnhams, on April 15, 1948, 
served notice of the cancellation of the Layton purchase con-
tract (Tr. 30). The sufficiency of the notice was never ques-
tioned by the Laytons. On the contrary, Clifton B. Layton 
pleaded (Tr. 36): 
·'This defendant, being unable to make payment of 
14 
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the purchase price of said property so advanced by the 
said Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham, was 
compelled to suffer the cancellation of the said agree-
ment.'' 
The case was tried on that pleading, Grover Giles appearing 
as attorney for Layton. No amendment was asked for or made. 
Jack B. Layton pleaded as follows (Tr. 39): 
nAdmit that Perry E. Burnham and L .. Earl Burn-
ham have acquired by purchase the real estate described 
in the Mortgage, Exhibit B, and that they are now the 
owners in fee of said property." 
The Burnhams pleaded the same thing. The court, by supple-
mental findings in the form of a letter (Tr. 51) found: 
CCThe pleadings and the evidence· shows that Clifton 
B. Layton assigned all his interest in the contract of 
November 22nd, 1946, to Jack B. Layton, and the. de-
fendant Jack B. Layton, by his answer, expressly ad-
mitted (that Perry E. Burnham and L. Earl Burnham 
have acquired by purchase the real estate described 
in the mortgage, exhibit B . . . ' " 
The court further found (Finding No. 4-Tr. 45): 
((That at the time of the execution of said mortgage, 
the interest of the said Clifton Layton and Lois Layton 
in said property was that of a purchaser thereof, evi-
denced by a written agreement executed and delivered 
on the 22nd day of November, 1946 ... " 
and further (Finding No. 8-Tr. 47): 
((That sometime in April, 1948, the said Burnhams 
served a written notice of forfeiture upon the said A. 
Edsel Christensen and Ray Rosenbraugh and others, 
as shown by the exhibit introduced in evidence herein. 
That the said Burnhams did not give this plaintiff 
15 
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(Stewart) or the said Christensen and Rosebraugh 
or any of them an opportunity to pay the palance unpaid 
on said contract of November 22, 1946, and did not 
give any of such persons advance notice of their in-
tention to forfeit said contract and did not at any time 
tender to Christensen and Rosebraugh or the plaintiff 
or any of them a deed to the property described in 
said agreement of November 22, 1946, or any part 
or portion thereof.'' 
We have quoted from all these documents for the pur-
pose of meeting the contention of counsel and apparently the 
conclusion of the court that by these findings, the notice as to 
the Laytons was disregarded as insufficient. That is not the fact 
as shown by the pleadings, and it was not the intention of the 
court as disclosed by the clearest kind of language which 
limited the annulment of the notice to Christensen and Rose-
braugh and the plaintiff Stewart in that case. The Laytons had 
a perfect right to accept, as the lesser of two evils, the can-
cellation of the contract of the sale of the property during the 
course of the foreclosure proceedings. The case was tried on 
that theory and while Layton will claim he was not properly 
represented, the court will find that he was represented by in-
dependent counsel as found by the court, and yet he elected 
to accept the cancellation of the contract and thereby end his 
connection with it. 
At no time after the Burnhams paid the $46,104.35 were 
the Laytons in possession of the property, and at no time were 
they entitled to the possession of it 
It is difficult to understand the theory of the District 
Court for Blaine County in ordering the sale of the property. 
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The Decree does not, in any respect, follow the Complaint, 
the evidence or the findings, for the court found Layton had 
only the right to purchase the land under the contract with the 
Cove Ranch, owners, when he gave the mortgage, and so the 
pleader in the foreclosure suit pleaded that right. The court 
found that right and nothing more. Furthermore, the plead-
ings disclosed without denial, that the Burnhams owned the 
ranch. Notwithstanding these admissions, the court made a 
Decree ordering the sale of the land itself, not of the right 
being foreclosed, to-wit: the right to purchase the land. 
The Burnhams had a perfect right to stand upon their 
contract and if redemption had been made, not of the sale of 
the property itself, but of the right to purchase the property 
by Stewart, as the record stood, the Burnhams may have been 
compelled to specifically perform by conveying the land to 
Stewart and accepting the purchase price as determined by 
the court, if a controversy existed. Stewart did not elect to 
complete the purchase under the contract. These· relations 
do not disclose any right of redemption or any other right 
except insofar as Stewart was concerned, the right to perform, 
and~so far as Laytons were concerned, no rights at all. 
An appeal was not taken from the judgment of the dis-
trict court and when the Reids appeared on the scene with 
an offer to perform the contract by paying Burnhams the full 
amount of th~ir m~ney, with interest, costs and expenses, they 
accepted. In the meantime, however, and in obedience to the 
decree of the court, the Sheriff for Blaine County went through 
the formality of the sale of the ranch owned by Burnhams 
to the Burnhatns; and in order to clear the record, Burnhams 
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agreed to accept the money from the Reids and to give th~m 
whatever documents were necessary insofar as the Burnhams 
were concerned, to -clear title to the property. The trial court 
in this proceeding was therefore in clear error in assuming 
the relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee existed. The 
court evident! y divided the money under the Idaho statute, 
applicable only in usual cases of execution or foreclosure sale. 
The statute has no application to this case. 
POINTS V AND VI 
POINT V 
THE COURT ARBITRARILY, WITHOUT APPLICA-
TION OR JUSTIFICATION, REVIVED THE CANCELLED 
CONTRACT BETWEEN THE COVE RANCH AND LAY-
-TON AND GAVE Tl-IE LA YTONS A RIGHT OF REDEMP-
TION WHICH WAS N_OT GIVEN BY THE DISTRICT 
COURT FOR IDAHO AND THE COURT HAS, IN DIS-
REGARD OF THE CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAINTIFFS 
AND DEFENDANTS, ADDED A RIGHT WHICH DID 
NOT EXIST. 
POINT VI 
THE COURT MISINTERPRETED EXHIBIT A TO 
THE COMPLAINT, (CONTRACT BETWEEN PLAIN-
TIFFS AND DEFENDANTS) BY MAKING IT INCLUDE 
AS PROPERTY SOLD BY PLAINTIFFS TO THE DEFEND-
ANTS, PERSONAL PROPERTY, TO-WIT: THE CROPS 
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f 
WHICH WERE HARVESTED AND READY FOR HAR-
VEST AT THE TIME OF. THE CONTRACT AND WHICH 
WERE NOT INCLUDED IN THE SALE, EXCEPT AS TO 
THAT PORTION SPECIFICALLY COVERED BY THE 
CONTRACT. 
The claim of the defendants to any part of the proceeds 
of the sale of the landlord's share of the hay and grain must 
necessarily be based upon a right o~. redemption supposed to 
have been acquired by the quit-claim deeds from the Laytons, 
or upon the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants. 
As we have shown, the contract gave them the land, the title 
to which they would get through deeds from the Burnhams 
and through the certificat~ of redemption, given merely to 
clear the title. By the express terms of the contract, in addition 
to the land, they were to have a portion of the landlord's 
share of the crop, which was designated in the contract and 
paid to them. There is no difficulty therefore in coming to the 
inevitable conclusion that the defendants acquired no part of 
the crops through the contract. 
We pass now to the supposed right of redemption of the 
Laytons. We have quoted from the pleadings·, the findings, 
the Decree and the O~der of the court .fixing the amount pay-
able if a redepmtion is made, and in which the court expressly 
states that he does not pass upon any question of the right 
of any party to the litigation to redeem. There is, therefore, 
no adjudication of the right of the Laytons to redeem. The 
trial court has not made it clear as to the basis of the judgment, 
but he seems to proceed upon the theory that it is a statutory 
mortgage foreclosure and therefore the right of redemption 
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follows. Bearing in mind that the right to co1nplete the pur-
chase of the prop~rty under the contract between Cove Ranch 
and Layton was the subject matter of the. Stewart suit, it is 
clear under the Idaho statutes, which we will assume are the 
same as Utah statutes, that through the proceedings, Ste\vart 
acquired the right by the sale to perforn1 by paying Burnhams 
their money. Inasmuch as that is the right which was sold, 
had Stewart become the purchaser or had he redeemed from 
the Burnhams, Layton would have had the ·right to redeem 
in turn from Stewart. That would be the law under Title 104-
3 7-30, Utah Code Annotated 1943, because Layton was the 
judgment debtor· of Stewart-not of Burnhams. 
Stewart did not elect to perform the contract between 
Layton and the Cove Ranch and his judgment was never paid, 
and Layton never reacquired the right to perform the con-
tract by redeeming from the sale in Stewart vs. Layton et al. 
Inasmuch as he did not come within the terms of the statute 
referred to or Rule 69 (f), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which supersedes the statute and which we assume is the 
same as the Idaho statutes, whatever rights Stewart had with 
respect to the Cove Ranch contract were wiped out by the 
sales to Burnham. 
The right of redemption, having been developed in the 
courts of equity and given effect by statutes, was nevertheless 
based upon equitable principals. These principals are adverted 
to in Ferguson -vs. Sullivan, Idaho, 74 P. 2nd 183, wherein 
.. the court said, in referring to the Idaho statute: 
CtUnder this statute the purchaser was only entitlcJ 
to receive tThe value of the use and occupation' of the 
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premises from the date of sale, May 25, and not from 
the beginning of the year. For the same reason the 
original owner was entitled to the value for the use 
and occupation of the premises up to the time she lost 
the title."' 
Applying this principal, neither Layton nor the defendant's, 
at any time, had the title to the property. Hence, they could 
not have lost it and by the same token, Burnhams, at all times 
having the title and having paid the purchase price of the 
property, were entitled to all of the proceeds of the sale of 
the crops excepting only what they sold to Reids in the con-
tract (Exhibit_ A to the Complaint-Tr. 8). These proceeds 
would not only include all of the $6,258.05, held in escrow, 
but the additional sums of $1280.00, representing one-half 
of the hay produced in 1950, and $3,589.67 recei-yed by de~ 
fendants as proceeds fro~ the other crops grown upon the 
ranch during that year. These amounts· are set forth in detail 
in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint at page 6 thereof, (Tr. 
121), and admitted in paragraph 9 of defendants' Answer 
(Tr. 128). The defendants got one-third of the landlord's 
share of the crops, and they are not, under the terms of the 
contract with £_lain tiffs, in any view of the matter, entitled 
to more. No attack has been made upon the contract and no 
reason has been assigned for the interpretation of it contrary 
to the express language used by the parties therein. The c~n­
tract excludes from its operation the quarter ·section of land 
upon which the grain referred to in plaintiffs' second cause of 
action was produced (Tr. 122-123). The plaintiffs should 
also have all ·of the grain grown upon that land and this 
aspect of the case is considered in argument under the next 
point assigned as error. 
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POINT VII 
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY REFUSED TO AD-
JUDICATE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE WHEAT GROWN 
UPON THE GROUND DESCRIBED IN THE AMEND-
MENT TO THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF 
LACK OF JURISDICTION. NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
WHEAT HAD NO RELATIONSHIP TO THE LAND, 
HAVING BEEN SEVERED, AND THE PARTIES TO THE 
CONTROVERSY WERE ALL, BY STIPULATION AND 
ORDER OF THE COURT, :M;ADE PARTIES TO THIS 
PROCEEDING. THE . COURT ERRED IN HOLDING 
SOMETHING MORE THAN PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
WAS REQUIRED. 
The court will find by the contract (Exhibit A-T r. 9) 
that the defendants expressly disclaimed any interest in or to 
the real estate. Notwithstanding this disclaimer, they allege 
that they leased the property to R. D. Hess, who took posses-
sion of it, cultivated and harvested the crops, after which and 
while this case was pending, they signed the stipulation (Tr. 
68) to the effect 
tC .- •• that the Court may make and enter a Declara-
tory Judgment adjudging the ownership of the wheat 
therein referred to." 
and attached to the Stipulation was the amendment and sup-
plement to the Complaint to the effect that by demands and 
threats they procured possession of the wheat and the court 
made an order to the effect that: (Tr. 67) 
ct ••• plaintiffs may file an amended cotnplaint and 
\V hen such pleading is filed the Court rna y enter a 
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declaratory judgment adjudging the ownership of the 
wheat refered to therein." 
That involved $1,135.49 for 44,740 pounds of wheat grown 
on that land. As to this cause of action, it was ·purely and 
strictly personal, and the court had the absolute,· unquestioned 
jurisdiction to make the adjudication and should do so. The 
subject matter was personal property and in no way involved 
an adjudication of the ownership of the land from which the 
wheat was produced. We recognize that jurisdiction of a 
court cannot be conferred by consent or agreement of the party 
litigants, where the ~ourt is without jurisdiction. Hardy vs. 
l\ieadows, 71 Utah 255, 264 Pac. 968. However, in determin-
ing jurisdiction of a district court, this court in the case of 
Kramer vs. Pix:ton, 72 Utah 1, 268 Pac. 1029, said: 
ttThe test is not whether the court has jurisdiction 
of a particular case, but rather whether the court 
has jurisdiction of the· class of cases to which the par-
ticular case belongs.'' 
The parties were residents of Utah, personally before the 
court, and as before stated, the defendants herein expressly 
disclaimed any assertion of ownership of that particular land. 
CONCLUSION 
We do not wish to appear repetitious or belabor our 
argument, but in conclusion we must reiterate that the causes 
of action set forth by plaintiffs and appellants herein do not 
involve the title to or the possession of real estate. The trans-
action between the respective parties was in effect a sale of 
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the Cove Ranch by the plaintiffs to the defendants, less the 
160 acres retained by plaintiffs, and the certificate of redemp-
tion was given only at the request of defendants for the clear-
ing of title to said property. We respectfully urge that the 
district court should have entered judgment for. the plaintiffs 
with respect to the ent~re sum of money held in escrow, for the 
sums of money received . by defendants from the sale of the 
other crops harvested prior to the said sale of the land, and 
for the value of the wheat grown upon the 160 acres of land 
retained by the· plaintiffs under the express terms of said con-
tract of sale. 
Respe~tfully sub~itted, 
J.D. SKEEN 
F. ROBERT BAYLE 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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